Beyond the level of reliability of the Iranian smiles, beyond the unprecedented attitude of an American President towards Muslims, beyond the disputes over the legality or legitimacy of Netanyahu's speech in the Congress, and beyond the extremely undesirable, yet expected nuclearization of the Middle East, four key questions ought to pragmatically be addressed: (a) What is the level of likelihood that Iran will try – sooner or later – to produce nuclear warheads (NW)? (b) What is the level of feasibility that Iran will succeed in doing this? (c) What is the level of likelihood that Iran will leverage NW possession, for a variety of purposes? (d) What is the level of likelihood that Iran will employ NW, in whatever mode, constituting a first strike? Assumed to be the four questions that overshadow other related aspects and issues, the present paper aims to focus on them, so as to probe the future derived out of the ongoing interface between Iran and the P5+1, with the US under President Obama being foremost. The importance and meaningfulness of such an inquiry are self evident. It refers to a future agreement with Iran, which might be regarded, objectively, as one that is an intermediate between a good agreement and a bad agreement. (a) - The level of likelihood that Iran will try, whether sooner or later, to produce nuclear warheads: Very high, and the emphasis is on nuclear warheads being the pursued concrete outcome, not the preceding stages. Iran has already established a clear modus operandi in that respect, while relapse breaching of past Iranian undertakings occurred over and over, involving nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. There is no reason to believe that Iran will not adhere to the same policy, not at all recognizing the term 'commitment' (as a state party to the related international conventions); and relying, as it has consistently, on a calculus that considers only the chances of being caught and the resultant penalty. Iran plans its conduct In straight correlation with the net weight of those two factors, also bringing into account the essentiality Iran attributes to possession of NW. The geostrategic position of Iran in Asia – particularly in relation to nuclear weapon possessors, namely Pakistan, India, China, Russia and, allegedly, Israel – is one main drive for Iran's unchangeable pursuit of NW. (b) - T he level of feasibility that Iran will succeed in doing this: High, resulting from two capabilities Iran has already acquired: technological ability to master and apply the knowhow Iran has for producing nuclear warheads; and, skillful capacity to do this in an undetectable fashion, thanks to accumulating both its own experience and friendly North Korean experience. While it is unclear whether or not China really cares about Iran becoming a NW possessor, it is obvious that the 'little sister', North Korea – a NW possessor state – is totally supportive, with a prolonged chapter of nuclear and ballistic collaboration with Iran. North Korea is liable to provide Iran, clandestinely, with the complementary components that Iran might possibly still need for successful, undetectable production of NW. Moreover, North Korea likely constitutes a perfect model for Iran, in terms of a country that became a NW possessor, subsequent to a prolonged and cynical, to say the least, 'ping-pong' game with the USA and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although different in a way, the essence of the North Korean path to NW dovetails with the still ongoing Iranian one. It may hence meticulously be followed by Iran, with expedient modifications that Iran will apply when needed. Iran is apt to adopt the North Korean model. The direct assistance lent to the Syrian nuclear weapons program by North Korea in the 2000s, blessed – to say the least – by Iran, is strongly indicative of an ongoing Iranian-North Korean NW nexus. (c) - T he level of likelihood that Iran will leverage NW possession, for a variety of purposes: Very high. As clearly seen at the present time, particularly, Iran fulfills in effect its pristine ideology of gaining hegemony across the Middle East. The so-called Arab Spring, and later Arab Winter, became an excellent platform for Iran, and is soberly exploited by her for that very purpose, under whatever excuses or cover stories. NW would be a perfect means for subsequently retaining and expanding its achievements in that sphere, by way of leveraging NW possession. Iran will certainly work out the expedient maneuvers to sophisticatedly do so. Further, it is highly expected that Iran will adopt such modus operandi to achieve various additional geopolitical, geostrategic and military goals. Very elegantly, yet unequivocally, Iran is prone to leverage NW possession. This noticeable Iranian characteristic of 'unequivocal elegance' is an integral component of her profile, artfully displayed by her for a long time. It is an asset Iran owns, nearly singularly. It would be naive to assume Iran will not make use, systematically, of that asset as a NW possessor. Under future circumstances of brinkmanship – whether acute or lasting; whether formed by her or otherwise – Iran should be regarded as a NW possessor that will methodically take advantage of such status. The implications and consequences in the Middle East and beyond, should be appreciated. They are far-reaching. (d) –T he level of likelihood that Iran will employ NW, in whatever mode, constituting a first strike Inexcludable. The infamous Iranian statement contending, already in 2003, that Israel should be wiped out, and one atomic bomb can destroy Israel, while only small part of Iran will be destroyed by an Israeli atomic strike, is basically as valid today as was it then. Unlike the respectable past of the Persian legacy for thousands of years, Khomeini established a regime in Iran which is an aberration, hence it might take radical decisions, either within the context of (c) or (d). Aside from means of deterrence posed by the international community and by Israel, no other factors, whatsoever, would prevent Iran from trying to fulfill the dreams of the present aberrational regime. Nuclear terrorism might as well be a mode that Iran could employ, not merely against Israel. Although at present it seems unlikely, (d) is liable to change, regionally and globally, particularly due to the Middle East turmoil. Once Iran becomes a NW possessor, this will be irreversible, since regional and global circumstances are prone to evolve negatively and in an unforeseeable manner. Whatever might be the current reasons fueling the Iranian unquestionable – if ostensibly latent – pursuit of NW, the very future possession of NW by Iran is therefore too risky, way beyond the perceivable present. All in all, then, according to this analysis: (a) Very high (b) High (c) Very high (d) Inexcludable. Thus, (a), an attempt by Iran to produce nuclear warheads, is a precondition for the rest, and (b), its success in doing so, is a precondition for (c), and (d), while (c) is not necessarily a precondition for (d); nevertheless (c), the leverage of nuclear possession, which is highly likely to take place, collectively, is devastating in itself, certainly for the Middle East, and, potentially, much beyond. It therefore should hence be regarded as a factor bearing enormous negative corollaries, irrespective of the prospects of (d), the actual employment of nuclear weapons. The latter factor, (d), if apocalyptic, is typically within the category of risk assessments that embody the proportion between probability and impact; meaning, albeit of low probability, the magnitude of its impact is such that overshadows nearly any level of probability which is above zero, particularly within the context of a chaotic, unpredictable Middle East, and global instability.
